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The top ten worst technical things about the road
Summarised from the “Review of the Case for the Heysham M6 Link Road” by a national planning expert, commissioned by TSLM.
1. The road would not reduce congestion.
On many roads there would be little reduction in traffic. On the most congested routes the reduction is so insignificant that it would not make much difference. In any case, induced traffic (created by the new road) would quickly erode any temporary relief.
2. The road would not create opportunities to improve walking, cycling and public transport.
The opportunities are either already there or not possible even with the new road. The only specific proposal, for a footway/ cycleway along the new road, would be unattractive and not well used.
3. The road would not regenerate the area.
Regeneration benefits of new roads are at best unproven, and at worst a mirage. The Economic Impact Report claims that all existing development land will fill with jobs if the road is built. But it offers no proof. Indeed, without a road, development land is already being used and Heysham port is expanding. Labour mobility is not a problem; the vast majority of commuters live within 3 miles of their work, so would benefit more from improved public transport, rather than having to depend on their cars.
4. The road would not benefit 97.5% of traffic on the network.
Of the four overall objectives, faster journey times to the Port of Heysham is the only one which the proposal partially satisfies; but it benefits only 2.5% of traffic on the district’s roads.
5. The scheme fails to follow government guidance.
It ignores Government guidance on the appraisal process. There should be real alternatives to a roads-led solution, but they are completely absent. This perpetuates a now discredited belief that in an urban context major new road capacity can provide lasting relief to the existing network.
DfT guidance insists that many options are identified and appraised, and the most suitable ones selected, progressively, to reach a preferred solution, a next best option and a low cost alternative. This procedure has not been followed. Indeed, LCC has presented the western route as the 'next-best option': an absurd choice, as it was rejected out of hand 12 months earlier and is described by LCC as "unbuildable"!
This is part of a wider failing to follow government guidance on the appraisal process, which undermines many aspects of the scheme and has contributed to its lack of public acceptance.
6. The scheme does not satisfy regional objectives and priorities.
The regional priority is improvements to the road link to the port of Heysham, not a new road link. New road construction should only be the option of last resort; the emphasis should be on making the best use of the existing infrastructure.
7. The public has not been consulted.
Massive public opposition to the scheme has been ignored. This contravenes government guidance: consultation with stakeholders, people or organisations affected by the scheme, should be an integral part of the appraisal process.
8. Traffic modelling is questionable.
Where there is serious congestion, and where most existing local traffic will not reassign to the new road, it is misguided to pretend that traffic levels on existing roads will not rise back towards the current situation fairly rapidly. This could only be avoided with significant demand management measures, like road user charging, fully integrated into the solution.
9. Highway design is questionable.
The remodelling of M6 Junction 34 is very complicated. For example, to reach the new road from the M6 Southbound, one travels across the river, round a cloverleaf exit, under the motorway, turn right across a major stream of traffic coming out of Lancaster, back across the river, arriving 2.5 km later at the roundabout 150m from the motorway. It is a poor design solution, and contributes to the very high scheme costs.
10. Value for money is poor.
LCC’s assessment relies too much on 60 year forecasts and unproven regeneration benefits. It ignores impacts which cannot be given a money value, but which guidance insists must be evaluated in the value for money analysis, for example, the effect on the landscape. Costs will inevitably increase: already, the Lune bridge has been judged defective, and must be redesigned with a wider span.
Conclusion
A long time ago, the planners decided that a new road was needed to access the Heysham peninsula. The western route was rejected in 2004, and the northern route became the preferred scheme. Present guidance requires the process to start with a “blank sheet” and a wide range of possible solutions, and to explore how different solutions could work together. This scheme has not followed that recommended process.
The Northern Route will not solve the district’s congestion problems. Other less damaging solutions must be identified and appraised before this scheme is even considered.
Read the report summary and download the full report here
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